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located within the municipality; or (iii) the adoption, amendment
or repeal of any official map, subdivision or land ordinance, zoning
ordinance or planned residential development ordinance shall be
submitted to the county planning agency for its recommendations.
The recommendation of the planning agency shall be made to the
governing body of the municipality within thirty days.39
In relation to school districts the Code also provides that:
Any proposed action of the governing body of any school district
located within the municipality or county relating to the location,
demolition, removal or sale of any school district structure shall
be submitted to the
municipal or county planning agency for its
40
recommendations .

It is proposed that the practical solution is to allow the zoning power
to rest predominantly with the zoning board who are best equipped and
qualified to plan for the orderly development of the cities. The courts
should only circumvent the zoning authority when the opposing municipal corporation can: (1) establish that the zoning legislation is not
reasonably related to the health, safety and morals of the community;
or (2) demonstrate that the legislation upon which it bases its authority
is so comprehensive that it rebuts the presumption in favor of the
zoning board's authority.
Frederick B. Gieg, Jr.

LABOR

LAW-DECERTIFICATION-UNION

DISCIPLINE-The

National

Labor Relations Board has held that the union commits an unfair
labor practice under Section 8(b)(1)(A) of National Labor Relations
Act when it fines a member who is attempting to institute decertification proceedings against it, because the fine is not only a punitive measure which inhibits access by the member to the processes of the Board
but is also an ineffective deterrent to decertification.
InternationalMolders and Allied Workers Union, Local 125, AFLCIO (Blackhawk Tanning Co., Inc.). 178 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 72 L.R.R.M.
1049 (1969).
Approximately one year after the incumbent union was certified, several of its members began canvassing their fellow employees to seek
enough support to petition for a decertification election. The union
39.
40.

432

Id.
Id.

Recent Decisions
responded by imposing a $100 fine on those members participating in
the decertification attempt. The procedure for fining followed by the
union complied with the requirements of substantive due process.'
One of the members who had been fined filed an unfair labor practice
charge asserting that the union had committed a violation under Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act 2 of the member's
Section 7 right to refrain from engaging in collective bargaining
through representatives of his own choosing. 3
The National Labor Relations Board upheld the finding of the
Trial Examiner that the fining of those seeking to have the union
4
decertified was an unfair labor practice under Section 8(b)(1)(A).
The Board majority balanced the public policy of encouraging free
access to the machinery of the Board against the proviso to Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act which permits the union to regulate its internal
affairs. 5
The Board's holding was an extension of a line of cases decided by
the Board and the courts dealing with the relationship between Section
7 and the proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. These cases comprehend the extent to which a union may discipline its members in
accordance with the union's grant of authority under the proviso to
Section 8(b)(1)(A). The cases fall within two broad categories, each of
which gives rise to qualitatively different rules of law relevant to the
outcome of the Blackhawk case: 1) where the member is engaging in
activity which does not initially involve access to the Board; and 2) where
1. It is pertinent to note that in Blackhawk there is no issue as to whether or not
the union violated the "Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations." LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5)
(1964). See note 11, supra, for the text of subsection (a)(5), which is interpreted by the
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Maine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
2. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (popularly known as the Taft-Hartley Act),
61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 141. Section 8(b)(l)(A), provides:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-(1) to
restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of
membership therein ....
29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964).
3. Section 7 of the Act, entitled "Rights of Employees," provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any
or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
4. Blackhawk Tanning Co., Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 72 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1969).
5. Id.
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the member initially attempts to invoke the processes of the Board in
an action directed against the union.
The first category is delineated by two cases: NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co. 6 and Scofield v. NLRB, 7 each of which were decided by the
Supreme Court. In Allis-Chalmers the Court held that the union could
impose a judicially enforceable fine (as distinguished from a fine enforceable only by threat of expulsion) on a full union member.8 The
member had violated a union bylaw by crossing his union's picket line
during a strike ratified by the union membership. In Scofield the Court
held that the union could impose both a judicially enforceable fine
and suspend a union member who violated the terms of a valid collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the union.
The rule thus enunciated in Allis-Chalmers and Scofield is that the
union may bring the device of a judicially enforceable fine to bear
upon the recalcitrant member who attempts to engage in activities
detrimental to the union which do not involve an attempt at the outset by the member to apply to the Board for relief.
The second category involves union discipline of the member who
files an unfair labor practice charge against it or the member who petitions the Board in an effort to have the union decertified. The majority
of the Board based its opinion on four cases within the ambit of the
second category. The skeletal facts and enunciated rule of law in each
of these cases will therefore be examined.
In Local 138, OperatingEngineers (Charles Skura),9 a union member
who filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board was fined by
the union on the ground that he had failed to exhaust the union's
internal procedures for seeking a remedy for his grievance. The Board
held that the union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A), in that the fine is by
nature coercive, and as such conflicts with the Section 7 rights of the
member.
6. 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
7. 394 U.S. 423 (1968).
8. The Court intimated that there was a question as to the validity of a fine imposed
on a member whose membership was limited solely to the obligation of paying monthly
dues, but withheld judgment until such issue would come before it. The Board in
Blackhawk was faced with a fact issue of full versus nominal-membership, but held that
it was not determinative of the central issue: "The only issue of fact in the case is
whether the employee who was fined was a full union member or a "financial core"
member-one who pays union dues and initiation fees as required by the union-security
contract, but refuses to join the union formally or to assume the obligations of full
membership. It is found, however, that for purposes of this case there is no valid distinction between a full union member and a financial core member." 72 L.R.R.M. at 1049.
9. 148 N.L.R.B. No. 674 (1964).
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In NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers
of America, AFL-CIO,10 the Supreme Court dealt with a fact situation
identical to that in Local 138. Here the Court, in reversing the judgment of the lower court and approving the approach taken by the Board
in Local 138, stated:
S..

the proviso in Section 8(b)(1)(A) that unions may design their

own rules respecting "the acquisition or retention of membership"
is not so broad as to give the union power to penalize a member
who invokes the protection of the Act for a matter that is in the
public domain and beyond the internal affairs of the union."
Essentially then, the rule set forth in Marine and Shipbuilding
Workers is that the union may not fine a member who files an unfair
labor practice charge against it.
In Tawas Tube Products, Inc.,12 the union expelled a member who
was attempting to have it decertified. In holding that the union did
not commit a Section 8(b)(1)(A) violation of the member's Section 7
rights, the Board distinguished between filing for decertification of a
union and filing an unfair labor practice against the union. It held
expulsion to be a valid weapon of union self-defense on the ground
that a member who has resorted to the Board in an effort to have his
union decertified would hardly be deterred by expulsion, within the
meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A)."
In Price v. NLRB,14 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit denied a petition to review an order of the Board that
the union did not commit a Section 8(b)(1)(A) violation when it sus10. 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
11. Id. at 425. The Court's holding was based on their interpretation of the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5)
which provides:
No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, or expelled or otherwise disciplined except for non-payment of dues by such organization or by any
officer thereof unless such member has been (A) served with written specific charges;
(B) given reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair
hearing.
12. 151 N.L.R.B. No. 9 (1965).
13. The Board in Tawas stated that:
This case, however, presents a situation where union members have resorted to the
Board for the purpose of attacking the very existence of their union rather than
as an effort to compel it to abide by the Act. We do not consider it beyond the competence of the Union to protect itself in this situation by the application of reasonable rules and discipline. Furthermore, the employees' attempt to repudiate the
Union by a decertification proceeding demonstrates that loss of membership was of
no significance to them; consequently their expulsion from the Union could hardly
be an effective deterrent against resorting to the Board.
Id.
14l. 373 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied 392 U.S. 904 (1968).
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pended from membership for five years a member of long standing"
who was trying to have the union decertified. The court endorsed the
Boards' rationale in Tawas Tube and enlarged upon it.16 More important in terms of the Blackhawk case was the Price court's response to
the fact that the union had also levied a fine on the member but had
later withdrawn the fine before the member became theoretically liable
to pay it. The court pointed out that the fine would not have become
operative until the expiration of the period of suspension; furthermore,
the court maintained that the fine could be likened to a fee for re
admission, and consequently not judicially enforceable. 17
As stated previously, the four cases in the second category provided
the precedent for the majority's holding in Blackhawk-that there is
a qualitative difference between expelling and fining a member who
has filed a decertification petition. Where the union expels such a
member, the majority reasoned, it is protecting itself against a potential
fifth columnist, privy to its strategy and tactics in its fight to maintain
its representative status; expulsion, it is argued, does not significantly
impede the free access of that member to the Board's processes." The
majority further reasoned that where the union merely imposes a fine
which is potentially enforceable in a court action, the fine has a chilling
effect on the readiness of the member to invoke the processes of the
Board. 1' 3
The dissenting members of the Board endeavored to point out that
where a strong union fines rather than expels a member, the fine is
often less harsh than expulsion because the expelled member may
lose union benefits which have accrued to him. 20 The dissent's main
15. Id. at 445.
16. The court said:
We think that, at the least, the proviso was intended to permit the union to suspend
or expel a member who takes such a position (attacking the union's position as bargaining agent). Otherwise, during the pre-election campaign, the member could
campaign against the union while remaining a member and therefore privy to the
union's strategy and tactics.
Id. at 447.
17. The Court noted with approval that:
The Board held that because the fine had been withdrawn at a time when Price was
not obligated to pay it, the mere levy of the fine was not an operative factor in this
case. We agree. The fine would not have become relevant until the end of the period
of suspension. It was in effect a fee for readmission, not a straight fine enforceable
in court.
Id. at 446.
18. Blackhawk Training Co., Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 72 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1969).
19. Id.
20. The dissent at 72 L.R.R.M. 1053 argued:
It does not answer the oft-repeated theme voiced by.both this Board and the Supreme Court that there is no meaningful distinction between fining and expulsion.
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objection to the majority rationale is, consequently, that there is no
meaningful difference between fining and expulsion and that fines are
permissible under a reasonable reading of the proviso to Section 8
(b)(1)(A). 21 The rationale of the dissent in Blackhawk is premised principally on the Supreme Court holding in Scofield22 and Mr. Justice
23
White's concurring opinion in Allis-Chalmers.
It thus becomes evident that the majority relied on the line of cases
in category two, and that the minority's position is based on the line
of cases in category one. While the Board was correct in distinguishing
between the filing of a decertification petition and the filing of an unfair labor practice charge against the union, it is believed that the
Board was remiss to the extent that it relied on its Tawas Tube position approving expulsion as a valid tactic to counteract the filing of
a decertification petition. Furthermore, it is believed that the Board
erroneously overlooked the possibility of applying the equally effective
yet less harsh remedy of suspension, a remedy which met with approval
in Price. It will be recalled that in Price the union, in addition to suspending the member for a five year period, imposed, then withdrew,
a fine on the member seeking its decertification. 24 The court, citing
Tawas Tube25 held that suspension as well as expulsion of the member
Nor is it likely that the majority's qualitative standards can be effectively applied if,
for example, future cases present such problems as: the coerciveness of a $5 union
fine as contrasted to a five-year suspension from the union; or a reasonable union fine
against suspension or expulsion from a union which may result in loss of such union
benefits as insurance and/or death benefits, and medical and pension benefits. (Emphasis added.)
21. Id. at 1051.
22. The dissent observed at 72 L.R.R.M. 1053 that:
In the recently decided Scofield case, the Supreme Court concluded that union imposed fines of $50 to $100 (including court action to collect such fines) on certain
members who exceeded union imposed production quotas was not violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A).
23. Mr. Justice White, in concurring, discussed the difference between fines and
expulsion in this way:
The dissenting opinion in this case, although not questioning the enforceability of
coercive rules by expulsion from membership, questions whether fines for violating
such rules are enforceable at all, by expulsion or otherwise. The dissent would at
least hold court collection of fines to be an unfair labor practice, apparently for the
reason that fines collectible in court may be more coercive than fines enforceable
by expulsion. My Brother Brennan, for the Court, takes a different view reasoning
that since expulsion would in many cases-certainly in this one involving a strong
union-be a far more coercive technique for enforcing a union rule and for collecting a reasonable fine than the threat of court enforcement, there is no basis for
thinking that Congress, having accepted expulsion as a permissible technique to enforce a rule in derogation of Section 7 rights, nevertheless intended to bar enforcement by another method which may be far less coercive. (Emphasis supplied.)
388 U.S. at 198.
24. Price v. NLRB, supra note 14.
25. Id. at 445.
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by the union was a valid protective measure. 26 It should be noted at
this point that if the union's response is suspension pending resolution
of the decertification proceedings rather than expulsion, the member
is permitted to retain union benefits accumulated during his membership if his bid fails and he elects to remain a member of the union.
The second significant point discussed but not decided in Pricewas that
the union might legitimately impose a fee for readmission after suspension. 27 Proceeding further with this view it would seem that if the
fee is reasonable and if the penalty for non-payment is expulsion rather
than court enforcement, the fee might not be deemed violative of the
proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A) as an attempt by the union to expand
its power over its members beyond regulation of its internal affairs.
The amount of the fee for readmission could rationally be the amount
of dues unpaid by the member during his suspension. It will be recalled that in Blackhawk the union had reached a collective bargaining
agreement with the employer only six months before decertification
proceedings began 28 and just six months after the union was certified.29
It may then be presumed that union was relatively weak and the dissident employees had "nothing to lose" by seeking the union's decertification. In Price,however, the member seeking decertification had been
a member for over thirteen years.30 If the present Board position, which
allows expulsion in such cases, were applied to a factual situation similar to Price, the member could be expelled, with the resultant loss of
union benefits accumulated over the span of union membership. The
dissent alluded to this possibility, but only for the purpose of comparing the relative coerciveness of a small fine to the effect on the member
3
of expulsion or suspension.

1

It is submitted that suspension will accomplish what should be the
only valid union objective-assuring that the dissident member could
not be privy to its strategy and tactics. Thus the union is effectively
protected without resort to the potentially punitive measure of expulsion. Indeed, the declaration of policy of the National Labor Relations
Act states as one of its basic purposes the protection of the rights of
32
the individual union member in relationship with his union. The
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
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Id. at 447.
Id. at 447.
See note 4, supra.
See note 4, supra.
Price v. NLRB, supra note 14 at 445.
See note 20, supra.
The declaration of policy at 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) of the Taft-Hartley
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union is an instrumentality whose existence is justfied when it is utilized
to strengthen the bargaining status of its members vis-a-vis the employer
so that it may obtain those terms of employment conducive to its members' welfare in the give and take of collective bargaining 8 Where,
then, union action crosses the boundary beyond which a valid weapon
of self defense becomes a weapon of offense when applied against a
member, that member's Section 7 rights are violated and such action
must be proscribed.
The Board's holding that fining a member for filing a decertification
petition is a union unfair labor practice was a proper interpretation
of the relationship between the member's Section 7 rights and the
union's Section 8(b)(1)(A) proviso right. It is believed, nonetheless,
that the Board should not have relied on it's holding in Tawas Tube,
but should have grasped the opportunity to correct the possibly injurious effect on the union member's rights of that decision by stating
that suspension, not expulsion, was the proper union remedy.
Leonard Zapler

LAW-ABORTION STATUTE-DUE PRocEss-The Supreme
Court of California has held that a statute prohibiting abortions not
"necessary to preserve" the mother's life is so vague and uncertain as
to be violative of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
CRIMINAL

People v. Belous, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 458 P.2d 194 (1969).
Appellant-defendant, a physician and surgeon considered eminent in
the field of obstetrics and gynecology, was convicted of abortion in
violation of section 2741 and conspiracy to commit an abortion, a violaAct states in part: "It is the purpose and policy of this chapter . .. to protect the rights
(Emphasis
of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations.
added.).
33. Mr. Justice Black stated for the dissent in Allis-Chalmers:
Section 7 and 8 together bespeak a strong purpose of Congress to leave workers
wholly free to determine in what concerted labor activities they will engage or
decline to engage. This freedom of workers to go their own way in this field, completely unhampered by pressures of employers or unions, is and always has been a
basic purpose of the labor legislation now under consideration.
338 U.S. 175, 216.
1. CAL. PEN. CODE § 274 (West 1955). This statute was amended in 1967 by what has
come to be called "The Therapeutic Abortion Act." This new enactment authorizes
an abortion if it takes place in an accredited hospital, is approved by a hospital staff

439

